Worth a thousand words

In Jerusalem yesterday.

Kerry's back in the region, promoting a vague plan to "strengthen the economy" in the West Bank in order to "give the Palestinian leaders more of a stake in a revived peace process." Netanyahu and his allies in the government are thrilled about this, one imagines, because it defers any talk of settlements.

Mahmoud Abbas wants Netanyahu to give Kerry a map outlining his "vision for a two-state solution," which Netanyahu has refused to do. Ma'ariv, meanwhile, reported this morning (Heb) that Israel wants Abbas to suspend reconciliation talks with Hamas as a precondition for any negotiations.

Obama throws in the towel

Not to keep harping on the point, but I think that's the easiest way to characterize the press conference he held just now with Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas.

In contrast to his remarks in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem yesterday, Obama was rambling and unfocused. He announced that the US would have to "think anew" about ways to restart the "peace process" — but didn't offer any new ideas. At one point he made a bizarre analogy to the US-Canada relationship, as if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be resolved as easily as America's occasional disputes with its neighbor to the north. Later he went on a tangent about Cisco hiring "Arab engineers."

He clearly had nothing to say to the Palestinians, and it showed.

But he did speak to the Israelis from Ramallah: He more or less gave them permission to continue building settlements in the occupied West Bank. He criticized the settlements as not "constructive" or "appropriate" (though not as "illegal") — but he also dismissed the Palestinian demand for a building freeze as a precondition to resume talks.

"With respect to Israel, the politics there are complex, and I recognize that's not an issue that's going to be solved immediately," he said. "When everything is settled ahead of time, there is no point for negotiations. it's important to work through this process, even if there are irritants on both sides."

Obviously this is axiomatic: If there someday is a "two-state solution," it will bring an end to Israeli settlements. But since no one in the region seriously expects that to happen, Obama's comments are a green light for Israel to keep building — which its new settler-filled government will be happy to do. (The politics are actually not too complex: Polls show that Israelis are roughly split on the issue of settlements, but successive governments have been strongly in favor.)

One wishes there had been a camera on Netanyahu while he watched Obama's performance.

Symbolism!

The seedling Obama planted in Jerusalem today with Israeli president Shimon Peres is being dug up by the Israeli agriculture ministry and sent to quarantine.

"Obama has brought a sapling with him; it will undergo examination because the entrance of foreign plants is forbidden without such an examination."

This is a metaphor for something.

How Obama learned to stop worrying and love the settlements

I wrote a longer piece about this for Al Jazeera, which will be going online in the next day or so. But a quick note in the interim:

After a full day of interviews in settlements in the West Bank, and several other trips over the last week, I'm struck by how much the settler population isn't angry or worried about Obama's upcoming visit to Israel. There's anger in Ariel, because the State Department pointedly refused to invite students from Ariel University to Obama's speech in Jerusalem. But otherwise he's being greeted with a shrug.

The consensus in the occupied West Bank is that Obama has basically given up on the issue of settlements — if not the "peace process" in general. Most of the people I talked with said something to the effect of "he has been totally useless on this issue for the past three years," ever since he pressured Netanyahu to impose an (ultimately useless and incomplete) settlement "freeze" in late 2009.

And is that such a bad thing? Benjamin Netanyahu's new government is stacked with settlers and their allies. An American-led push to resume negotiations would go nowhere; nobody expects Obama to parachute into town and demand a freeze.

He took office vowing to pursue a two-state solution "with all the patience that the task requires." Ironically, he might be remembered as the president who pulled the US back from its central role in trying to broker negotiations.

Update: Here's the full piece.

A government wired for dysfunction in Israel

I wrote up a quick analysis last night on the new Israeli government, which (now that Habayit Hayehudi has signed the coalition agreement) is finally a done deal. To summarize in one sentence: The government will push through some changes vis-a-vis the ultra-Orthodox — cutting some benefits, eventually drafting them into the army — but beyond that seems wired for dysfunction.

The center-left parties performed well in January's election by campaigning on socioeconomic issues. But the top priority for incoming finance minister Yair Lapid will be closing a NIS 15 billion deficit — making it difficult to spend money on social programs or improve anyone's standard of living.

The coalition can find maybe one billion in savings from slashing the haredi benefits, and another three billion from reducing the security budget, though the latter is politically difficult when the defense establishment is warning publicly about facing "four active borders for the first time in decades." Even if they manage to cut both, that still leaves another 11 billion shekels to trim.

Many analysts here also expect the government will merely shift spending from the ultra-Orthodox to the settlers. One example: The incoming housing minister, Uri Ariel, is staunchly pro-settler; a former aide told Ha'aretz today that he will "devote resources to the sector he comes from — the settlements of Judea and Samaria."

It's harder to say what the coalition means for security policy, which really was not a campaign issue. But clearly the preponderance of nationalists in key positions — Moshe Ya'alon at defense, Avigdor Lieberman at foreign affairs, Naftali Bennett as a major coalition partner — suggests there will be no appetite for talks with the Palestinians. Tzipi Livni's appointment as "chief peace processor" appears, as expected, mostly a fig leaf for a fundamentally right-wing government.

How long will the coalition last? Not long, according to the conventional wisdom here; I haven't spoken to anyone (except spokespeople for the coalition parties themselves) who expect Netanyahu's term to last longer than two years.

This depends partly on the opposition, an eclectic mix of liberals, ultra-Orthodox Jews and Arab parties. If Shelly Yachimovich can organize a credible opposition, and if the government fails to follow through on its socioeconomic promises, perhaps Yair Lapid will decide that his political future is better served by leaving the coalition and competing with Yachimovich to become the anti-Netanyahu.

But if the government can deliver on a few things, and if the opposition remains dysfunctional — usually a safe bet — then it's hard to picture Lapid or Bennett wandering off into the political wilderness, at least not in the foreseeable future.

The unbreakable alliance, slowly being papered over

In Jerusalem this morning. (actual substantive posts on Obama's visit will follow, eventually)

The locusts and Camp David

The Ramat HaNegev regional council in Israel has sent a letter to Morsi, via the Egyptian embassy in Tel Aviv, asking for permission (עברית) to deploy Israeli crop-dusters to spray the swarms of locusts on Sinai.

I'm sure the sight of Israeli planes spraying chemicals over Egypt won't prompt any worried reactions or wild conspiracy theories.

An unhappy Netanyahu gets a government

It's not official yet, but it probably will be by mid-week: Netanyahu will swear in a new government, just days before his six-week mandate is set to expire.

There's been a lot of talk about the socioeconomic positions in the cabinet — finance, housing, etc. — as well as the foreign ministry, which was fought over by Yair Lapid and the perhaps soon-to-be-convicted Avigdor Lieberman.

We've heard almost nothing about the defense ministry, but there are reports this morning that former IDF chief of staff Moshe Ya'alon (a Likud MK) will take the job. He's often described as a dovish voice on Iran, but my own sense, based on his public statements, is that he's simply a realist. He opposes a unilateral Israeli attack — "I hope that with regard to Iran it will be possible to say, as the old saw goes, that the work of the just is done by others," he told Ha'aretz last year — but he has been repeatedly critical of sanctions, and likes to say that the Iranian government must choose between "a bomb and survival."

Dan Meridor, the deputy prime minister who's often portrayed as a skeptic of attacking Iran, was forced out of Likud in last year's primary. Interior minister Eli Yishai, who has publicly opposed an attack, is also gone.

I still think we'll see less talk of a unilateral attack than in years past — but ironically, depending on the final slate of ministers, the next "security cabinet" could actually be more supportive of an attack than the current one.

On today's hooliganism in Cairo

The initial reaction to today's Port Said verdict was reminiscent of last year's verdict in the Mubarak trial, when initial joy quickly gave way to anger.

Judge Sobhi Abdel Meguid started by confirming the 21 death sentences announced in January, and this drew a huge cheer (plus fireworks and celebratory gunfire) from the 500 or so Ultras gathered outside the Al-Ahly headquarters in Gezira. But then the crowd started to learn more details — specifically that seven of nine police officers had been acquitted — and quieted down to debate a next move.

They never really settled on one. Some of the Ultras wanted to leave headquarters and start attacking police stations; a few teenagers walked through the crowd, encouraging people to storm the well-guarded interior ministry.

Others tried to organize peaceful protests, and for a time a few dozen Ultras blocked traffic on the 6th of October bridge.

In the end, most seemed to accept the torching of the police club and the football association as an acceptable response. The Ultras have actually denied setting these fires — but I watched a large crowd of them (some armed) run out of the police club as it burned, so we can probably conclude they're responsible. Several of them shot fireworks at a police helicopter that was circling overhead.

The arsonists came prepared, too: A few empty petrol cans were scattered around the grounds after the fire.

Obviously the hooliganism today is a symptom of larger issues, like the lack of any transitional justice since the revolution, the general failings of Egypt's political class, and the ever-declining trust in established institutions like the police and the judiciary.

It also ties into the ongoing struggle between Morsi and the interior ministry — at least, if you believe political considerations influenced the verdict. I listened to one man explain that it was simply unrealistic to expect all nine officers to be convicted.

Even if the evidence was strong, he said, Morsi is struggling to gain control over the security forces, and a slate of guilty verdicts would enrage a police force that already seems near mutiny. Then, outside the police club a few hours later, I listened to a heated argument about whether Hosni Mubarak would have handled this situation better.

"At least he wasn't afraid of the police!" one man said.